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ANONYMOUS BLOGGERS AND DEFAMATION:
BALANCING INTERESTS ON THE INTERNET
S. ELIZABETH MALLOY*
Professors Reynolds, Volokh, and Solove have each commented on the
relationship between libel law and the ever-growing "blogosphere." This
comment agrees as well as disagrees with several points from other
authors' opinions, as well as going further in arguing for the protection of
libel plaintiffs facing defamatory comments from anonymous bloggers.
In his article, "Libel in the Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts,"'
Glenn Harlan Reynolds comments on the lack of big-name libel suits
against anonymous bloggers, and explains why blogging is its own culture
and deserving of its own standards of review by the courts. He argues that
such suits are rare because most bloggers do not have deep pockets, the
threat of suit is frowned upon by the blogging community, "actual malice"
is difficult to prove, and fast corrections of incorrect information are easier
than in other mediums of communication.2 In addition, he argues that
blogs have "mutated" and become more commercial and journalistic in
nature. Because of the changing nature of blogs, Reynolds argues that
perhaps judicial review similar to that of slander is appropriate for
blogging defamation suits. In addition, he argues that the plaintiff should
be required to meet a high standard of proof for harm and that such
comments must be taken in the context they are written because of the
unique culture of blogging.
3
While Reynolds calls for a far more deferential standard for bloggers,
Daniel J. Solove, in his article "A Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech and
Privacy in the Blogosphere," argues that bloggers should have greater
accountability to their audiences.4 He argues that "We see blogging as
something that enhances the freedom of the little guy," but at the same
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. Blog: Health Law Prof Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/healthlawprof-blog. Many thanks to Professor Paul Caron for
inviting me to participate in this groundbreaking symposium. Thank you to my wonderful research
assistant Rebekah Van Drake for her help with this comment. Thank you to Ryan Martin for
introducing me to this interesting topic.
1. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Libel in the Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 84 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1157 (2006).
2. Id. at 1157 60.
3. Id. at 1166 67.
4. Daniel J. Solove, A Tale o/ Two Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy in the Blogosphere, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1195 (2006).
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time warns against affording bloggers too much speech protection.5 Even
though it is argued that free speech enhances "individual autonomy,"
political discussion, and a free flow of ideas, Solove argues that privacy
has the same goals and benefits and should be given greater deference.6
Though recognizing the difficulty of fashioning a new balancing test to
weigh the competing interests of privacy and free speech, Professor
Solove argues that current laws regulating the Internet provide a form of
immunity that may lead to irresponsibility and a lessening of privacy
protection.7
Though Reynolds and Solove each discuss issues relating to blog
defamation suits, this paper takes the discussion further and addresses the
issue of the proper standard to be applied to revealing the identity of the
anonymous blogger who faces allegations of defamation.8
As more and more people create personal websites and blogs, courts
are more frequently asked to rule on questions related to the Internet
boom. Specifically, an issue has arisen concerning what standard to apply
in defamation suits brought against anonymous bloggers. 9 Courts have
wrestled with producing an appropriate standard for revealing the identity
of an anonymous blogger who posts allegedly defamatory material on a
5. Id. at 1196.
6. Id. at 1198 99.
7. Id. at 1199 1200. In an earlier article, Professor Solove noted the difficulty in defining
privacy and the concept of autonomy and thus the resulting problems in developing an appropriately
protective standard. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy ofPrivacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 479 (2006)
(arguing that the broad concept of privacy is "about everything, and therefore it appears to be
nothing."). For a further examination of Professor Solove's views on the importance of privacy
protections, see Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justi&ing Privacy Protection Against
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L. J. 967, 988 98 (2003).
8. The Supreme Court has affirmed in several cases that the First Amendment protects a
speaker's choice to remain anonymous. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 62 (1960); McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995). Protection for anonymity has further been
recognized on the Internet. See John Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
9. A claim for defamation involving an anonymous defendant has a unique procedure in that,
before the trial, a hearing will be held to determine whether the identity of the defendant must be
disclosed so that discovery can proceed. This Comment focuses on what standard courts should apply
during such show of cause hearings to determine whether an anonymous defendant's identity should
be revealed. For a thorough review of some of the recent case law and the issues it raises for the First
Amendment as well as defamation claims, see Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe:
Defamation and Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000); Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking
"'John Doe" Defendants: The Case Against Excessive Hand- Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 OR.
L. REV. 795, 797 (2004); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and
Anonymous Speech (Minn. Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 06-37, 2006), available at
http:/ssrn.com/abstract-925376 (providing guidance to legislatures and courts for regulating
anonymous speakers as well as the rights of individuals to be free from defamatory comments and
maintain privacy).
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message board or website.10 Recently, in Doe v. Cahill,11 the Delaware
Supreme Court created a strict standard that makes it extremely difficult
for defamation victims to bring suit against anonymous bloggers. The
standard created is far too sympathetic to anonymous bloggers and fails to
address important issues facing victims of defamation.
In Doe v. Cahill, the plaintiff, a town council member, brought a
defamation suit against the defendant for false comments made on the
"Smyrna/Clayton Issues Blog," a website dedicated to a free-ranging
discussion of local politics. 12 The lower court applied a "good faith"
standard, which required that a plaintiff prove "(1) that they had a
legitimate, good faith basis upon which to bring the underlying claim; (2)
that the identifying information sought was directly and materially related
to their claim; and (3) that the information could not be obtained from any
other source."' 13 Application of this standard in the lower court indicated
that the plaintiffs had a good faith reason to require the identity of the
blogger in the defamation suit. However, the Supreme Court of Delaware
rejected the application of this standard, finding that "[the] 'good faith'
standard is too easily satisfied to protect sufficiently a defendant's right to
speak anonymously."
' 14
The Delaware Supreme Court instead applied a summary judgment
standard, which is far stricter than either the good faith standard applied by
the lower court or the motion to dismiss intermediate standard applied by
various other courts in Internet defamation suits. 15 The court held, "the
summary judgment standard is the appropriate test by which to strike the
balance between a defamation plaintiff's right to protect his reputation and
10. For examples of recent tests applied to anonymous bloggers, see Rocker Mgmt. LLC v. John
Does 1 20, No. 03-MC-33, 2003 WL 22149380 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (applying a totality of circumstances
approach to plaintiff's request that defendant's identity be disclosed and deciding that the defendant's
statements, when viewed in the context in which they were made, could only be seen as opinions and
thus immune from defamation suits); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001) (requiring plaintiff to notify defendant, set forth statements plaintiff believes to be
actionable, and set forth evidence supporting each element of the cause of action with the court
balancing the need for disclosure against the defendant's First Amendment right to speak
anonymously); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372
(Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co.,
261 Va. 350 (Va. 2001) (applying a "good faith" standard and noting that the right to speak
anonymously is not absolute).
11. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
12. The John Doe defendant criticized Mr. Cahill's performance as a city councilman, calling
him a "divisive impediment to any kind of cooperate movement" and further remarking on Mr.
Cahill's unstable mental state and paranoia. Id. at 454, 457.
13. Id.at454 55.
14. Id. at458.
15. See supra note 10 for recent case law.
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a defendant's right to exercise free speech anonymously." 16 The two-part
standard requires a plaintiff to take reasonable efforts to notify the
anonymous defendant and to present enough evidence to establish a prima
facie case for each element of the claim. 17 However, this court ruled public
figure plaintiffs are not required to provide evidence of actual malice,
because that evidence is not within their control before they know the
identity of the blogger. 8
In making its ruling, the court did "not rely on the nature of the internet
as a basis to justify ... application of the legal standard," and made "no
distinction between communications made on the internet and those made
through other traditional forms of media."' 9 Rather, the court noted that
"[the internet is a unique democratizing medium unlike anything that has
come before," and "[the advent of the internet dramatically changed the
nature of public discourse . . . . [S]peakers can bypass mainstream media
to speak directly" to the public. 20 In addition, the court ruled that
information on the Internet is not as reliable as other mediums. It argues
that blogs are often full of grammar and spelling problems, hyperbole, and
vulgarities. Thus, the court argued that a reasonable person would not
construe a blog as stating facts. The court applied this reasoning in Cahill
and found that a reasonable person would not have assumed the blog
statements were facts about the council member; therefore, the lower court
decision was reversed.21
Several problems arise with the application of the standard created in
Cahill, as well as with its characterization of the Internet and anonymous
blogs. First, the standard is highly deferential to anonymous bloggers. Not
only must the plaintiffs provide enough evidence to satisfy the summary
judgment burden, but they must also deal with a characterization of the
Internet that makes the task nearly impossible. The Cahill court focuses on
the crude nature of the writings on the Internet as merely indicative of
opinion. However, as the court notes itself, the Internet provides the ability
to reach millions of people at the press of a button.2 Although the ability
to post anonymously on the Internet allows certain individuals to express
their beliefs without fear of retaliation or discrimination, it also protects
16. Cahill, 884 A.3d at 460.
17. Id. at 460-61.
18. Id. at 464.
19. Id. at 465.
20. Id. at 455.
21. Id. at 466.
22. Id.
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careless and irresponsible individuals from the threat of lawsuits for their
false comments.
Most importantly, the Cahill court fails to look at the repercussions for
those who fall victim to these online anonymous bloggers. For instance,
employers who do background checks on possible future employees may
discover blog information that is false. If employment decisions are based
even in part on these bloggers' comments, victims suffer both emotional
and economic losses. 23 More ominously, some defamatory postings
involve off-line consequences even more harmful than humiliation or job
loss. These defamatory postings, such as those falsely accusing plaintiffs
of a crime or of engaging in an unpopular activity, may expose plaintiffs
to charges of treason or even to threats of violence. For instance, if an
individual is falsely accused of pedophilia, local residents may take the
law into their own hands.24 Doctors, who an anonymous blogger alleges
perform illegal late-term abortions or abortions on minors without proper
consent, may find it necessary to hire extra security or close their
practice. 25 In today's post-9/11 world, allegations that an individual has
ties to a terrorist organization may lead to unpleasant interactions with
government officials or worse.26
Similarly, a second problem with the court's opinion centers on its
characterization of blogs in general. The court indicated that, because of
the misspellings, hyperbole, and general nature of blogs, a reasonable
person would likely conclude that they only represent opinions.27 This
characterization seems to almost negate the need for a standard. If a
plaintiff brings a defamation suit he is almost guaranteed to fail because
23. For a discussion of employers' use of monitoring devices to review employee blogs and other
webpostings, see Rafael Gely and Leonard Bierman, Workplace Blogs and Workers' Privacy, 66 LA.
L. REV. 1079, 1084 88 (2006) (discussing cases involving the termination of employees for their work
and non-work posts on blogs).
24. See, e.g., Associated Press, Lawyer Accused in Stabbing Death o' Neighbor; Father
Allegedly Suspected Neighbor of Molesting his Young Daughter, available at http://www.msnbc.com/
id/14610951 (Sept. 1, 2006).
25. Pro-life activists have been known to justify violence against abortion providers in pursuit of
their goal to stop abortions. See Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d
1130, 1154 56 (D. Or. 1999) (granting an injunction under Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
prohibiting publication of defendant's website and poster with intent to threaten abortion providers).
For a further discussion concerning the regulation of such harm advocacy speech, see S. Elizabeth
Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting
Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1214 15 (2000).
26. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's Extraordinaiy
Rendition Program, 81 NEW YORKER 106 (2005); see also Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006)
(case of Jose Padilla, a United States citizen held for three years without charges as an "enemy
combatant").
27. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 466.
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the court has characterized personal blogs as difficult to interpret as fact by
a reasonable person. In addition, it creates an impetus for an anonymous
blogger to incorporate misspellings and vulgarities to mask statements and
evade the summary judgment standard. Though the court holds "[w]e do
not hold as a matter of law that statements made on a blog or in a chat
room can never be defamatory," it seems to characterize blogs in such a
way as to make it nearly impossible for plaintiffs to meet their burden.28
A third problem with the court's opinion is that it fails to provide a
plausible judicial outlet for plaintiffs and, instead, implies that
extrajudicial measures are more adequate. The court holds that, unlike
other mediums, a plaintiff in a defamation suit involving the Internet has
extrajudicial relief.29 A victim may log on to the same blog or website and
refute the comments made by the anonymous blogger. It held that "[the
plaintiff can thereby easily correct any misstatements or falsehoods,
respond to character attacks, and generally set the record straight."
30
However, the court seems to misstate the ease with which a defamation
victim may create his own relief. Chances are slim that the victim will
reach the same audience that has read the false statements. 31 It seems that
a victim will find little solace in hoping that he has reached the audience
that read the defamatory comments. The suggestion by the court seems to
be a veiled attempt to justify the summary judgment standard by
suggesting other means that a victim can utilize. A victim of defamation is
more likely to want the identity of the person known to silence them from
making further accusations. Instead, the court's suggestion will likely lead
to a war of words on the Internet, with neither side having any motivation
to end the retaliation. Tort law is meant to preserve parties from retaliating
on their own, but this court seems to endorse personal retribution to some
degree.
Finally, the court, though seemingly contradicting itself, holds that the
Internet will not be distinguished from any other medium of
communication; 32 however, the Internet is quite different than other
mediums in its ease of access, permanence, and pervasiveness. Gossip
through newspapers and even through people may take time, but it can
take merely seconds on the Internet. A person can make a false statement
out of anger and spite under the guise of anonymity much more easily than
28. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 467 n.78.
29. Id. at 464.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 465.
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through other mediums of communication. Once those comments are
made, their permanence increases their viability. Words are saved on
pages, saved to personal computers, printed, and spread through e-mail.33
One who falls victim to anonymous blogging has little ability to
completely destroy the statements. 34 In addition, as the court notes,
nothing controls what postings are permitted on the Internet, which leads
to pervasive and unregulated comments. 5 The court finds no legal
distinction between the Internet and classic mediums of communication
while at the same time illustrating the multiple differences between them.
The standard created in Cahill does not address the problems of ease of
access, permanence, or pervasiveness of defamatory information on the
Internet.
It is important not to silence communication on the Internet, but it is
just as important not to silence victims of defamation. The standard
created in Doe v. Cahill is strict and gives victims of anonymous blog
defamation little grounds for recovery. The Internet is a different medium
of communication and should not necessarily be judged on the grammar
and spelling of the content, but on the written words. Defamation victims
must have recourse against those anonymously making defamatory
comments about them because of the relative permanence of postings on
the Internet and the lack of regulation given to this medium of
communication. Although legislative and administrative regulation of the
Internet may be unnecessary, court oversight in the form of the protections
provided by defamation suits appears necessary to provide an appropriate
balance to the dueling rights presented by the case of anonymous bloggers.
33. Orin S. Kerr, Blog and the Legal Academy, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1127 (2006).
34. Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through
Implied Contracts q/'Conidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 927 (2006). See Google Cache feature,
http://www.google.com/help/features.html ("Google takes a snapshot of each page examined as it
crawls the web and caches these as a back up in case the original page is unavailable. If you click on
the 'cached' link you will see the web page as it looked when we indexed it.").
35. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 465.
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